control over the exploitation and pricing of their oil resources, the major international oil companies have shifted their capital spending and oil exploration efforts to the United States, the North Sea, and other politically safe non-OPEC areas. Some Western governments initiated programs to develop alternative energy sources. In the 1980s, the scales of power tipped away from OPEC. By 1985 OPEC's market share of global production was 30 percent, down from 54 percent in 1973. Its ability to influence prices was minimal.2
This strategy could not be sustained indefinitely. The growth of non-OPEC production has tapered off in recent years. The price crash of 1985-86proved to be a turning point of sorts. It forced greater cohesion on OPEC's members, and also made expensive non-OPEC production uneconomical. Non-OPEC output in the capitalist world, after peaking in 1985 with 44 percent of global production, declined to 39 percent last year (Table 1 ). OPEC's capacity utilization went Table I . World Oil Production
Loyal Producers
A core of Gulf oil exporters is thus pivotal for the supply of oil to the world economy. This is a key reason for Washington's intervention in the Kuwait crisis. In addition to the increasing dependence of major consuming countries on the oil deposits in the area, important ideological and practical afinities between the Gulf monarchies and the West make that reliance tolerable. Faced with rising oil import dependence, the Bush administration has made a strategic decision in favor of shoring up its Gulf allies militarily even while opposing policies at home that would constrain the American appetite for enerm6
These countries-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates-have by far the most extensive oil reserves in the world, rivaled only by Iraq and Iran, and the ability to expand production capacities to meet growing world demand. up from around 50 percent in the mid-1980s to 90 percent in 1990. OPEC's share of the world oil market is expected to climb from a current 39 percent to around 50 percent by 1995.3 This turnaround reflects underlying realities: the OPEC countries worldwide possess 74 percent of the world's known oil reserves. Those in the Gulf account for 62 percent. The Gulf states' proven reserves grew from 398 billion barrels in 1985to 572 billion barrels in 1988,while those of much of the rest of the world barely stayed even, despite huge expenditures on expl~ration.~ This has been most pronounced in the US, still by far the world's largest consumer of oil. Domestic production, steady from 1975to 1985thanks to Alaskan oil fields, is now in steep decline.=As a result, imports are ballooning and their composition is changing. During the first half of the 1980s, supplies from Mexico and the North Sea displaced OPEC oil in the US. The Gulf producers now account for 28 percent of all US imports, up from 7 percent in 1985 (Table 2) .
They have an interest in maintaining relatively low oil prices to secure long-term markets for their resources, whereas the more populous OPEC countries-Nigeria, Indonesia, Algeria, Iran and, to a degree, Iraq-are hard pressed to finance an array of civilian and military needs and to pay off foreign debts. Higher revenues over a much shorter stretch of time are in their interest.
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia both have invested a substantial part of their petrodollar surpluses in Western countries. Kuwaitis acquired controlling or minority holdings in a large number of companies, while Saudi Arabia primarily invested in bank deposits and government bonds and securities. Declining oil revenues have forced Saudi Arabia to draw down these deposits for much of the last decade. Today they are estimated at no more than $50-$60 billion, compared with a peak of $150 billion at the beginning of the 1 9 8 0~.~ In addition, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (and, outside the Middle East, Venezuela) have acquired refineries, marketing networks and other assets in the industrial markets.8 Structurally tied even more tightly to Western economies, they are unlikely to adopt production and pricing policies that might hurt the industrial economies. Kuwaiti income derived from foreign investments has exceeded the country's revenues from sales of crude oil and petroleum products in recent years.g Saudi Arabia has played a key role since the mid-1960s in keeping prices down. Riyadh opened the spigot in 1980 and 1981 to make up for lost supplies in the wake of the Iranian revolution and after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, to force fellow OPEC members to toe the line on pricing in 1986, and again following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to compensate for embargoed Iraqi and Kuwaiti crude.10
The trigger for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was the emirate's production far in excess of its OPEC output quota. This weakened world oil prices and came at the direct expense of Iraq. If Iraq had been able to hold on to Kuwait, it conceivably Iraq's show of force in late July 1990 raises an interesting question. Was Washington happy to see Saddam Hussein "enforce" price discipline within OPEC? Baghdad's interest clearly lay in moving prices upward to the $22-25 per barrel range to fill its depleted treasury. As the colloquy between Saddam Hussein and April Glaspie indicated, this did not exceed what US oil interests wanted.12
The US is playing a highly ambivalent role in the oil game. As the preeminent power seeking to preserve the conditions for the global capitalist economy to thrive, it promotes the flow of oil at reasonable prices. Japan and Western Europe are much more dependent on oil imports than the US (92 and 65 percent, respectively, of their consumption is imported-59 percent of Japan's and 29 percent of Europe's comes from the Gulf). On the other hand, the US has an interest in oil prices that permit higher-cost domestic production to remain competitive, a point not lost on President Bush, who made a would have taken a portion of Kuwait's production off the market in order to bolster prices. But Baghdad would not have been in a position to withhold any significant chunk of production from world markets. Oil accounts for over 90 percent of Iraq's export revenues and 61 percent of GDP.11 Indeed, before the invasion, Baghdad was planning to expand its own production capacity considerably over the next five years. The supply of oil, at least in the short run, was plentiful. The longer-term implications of the Kuwait takeover, however, were less certain.
What Price Oil?
The Bush administration's nonchalant attitude towards fortune in Texas oi1.13 Recall the events surrounding the first oil crisis in the early 1970s: Kissinger and Nixon appeared to think that the United States could derive competitive advantages vis-A-vis the highly import-dependent Europeans and Japanese.14 In the past two decades, however, Japan in particular has adapted very well to higher oil import costs through improved energy efficiency and now uses less than half the energy the US does to generate a dollar of GNP. In addition, the weak dollar has dampened the impact of rising oil prices on Western Europe and Japan.16
The Bush administration was less concerned about any modest increase in the price of oil than about the prospect of strong Iraqi influence over the oil policies of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies. The crisis once more underscored Saudi Arabia's unique position: even the total boycott of Iraqi than that of most other major firms. Oil production in Alaska, and Kuwaiti oil was of little consequence to the world econ-taxed at the comparatively low marginal rate of 34 percent, is omy as long as the Saudis boosted their output to compensate a boon for B P and also for Arco, Unocal, and Amerada Hess. for the supply loss. Leaving Iraq in a position to influence the Companies that enjoy very high self-sufficiency rates include Gulf monarchies, though, might have jeopardized Riyadh's Amoco and the French firm, Elf-Aquitaine. The operations of ability to moderate prices.
other majors, including Royal Dutch/Shell, one of the largest, The war against Iraq needs to be seen in the context of the are subject to marginal tax rates as high as 64 percent.ls shifting oil politics in the Gulf region. During the 19709, Iran
The second consideration relates to the "downstream" under the shah protected the political status quo. When refineries and distribution networks. During the early 19809, Khomeini's Iran turned against the West, the US moved rising crude oil prices depressed refinery profit margins, while closer to Iraq and shored up Baghdad's staying power in its falling crude prices allowed refiners greater margins. Because war against Iran. When the war ended in 1988, the monar-the Iraqi invasion led to the withdrawal of roughly 750,000 chies confronted a well-armed and economically hungry Iraq. barrels per day (b/d) of petroleum products (and another Determined to maintain the existing political order in the 500,000 b/d of refinery output went to the allied forces in Gulf, but now shorn of proxy forces, the United States felt Saudi Arabia), refining profits have jumped.19 During the compelled to intervene directly.
second oil crisis in 1979-80, US refineries used 74 percent of Oil companies-some more than others-were clear win-their capacity; now they are running at 92 percent. Those companies that are more strongly involved in refining than in distribution-Ultramar, Diamond Shamrock and Ashland A third factor concerns the degree to which oil companies lBillions of barrels. 2hnillions of barrels per day, 3The "Seven Sisters8'minus have invested in the petrochemical industry. overcapacities Oil (acquired by Chevron) plus Amoco and Arco). 425 companies from major oil in this industry make it impossible to pass through higher producing nations. 532 companies,mostly smaller privatefirms but also some partially for the mostimportant petrochemical feedstock, naphor wholly state-owned enterprises whose operations are not primarily based on domestic oil reserve holdings. 6~n c o m~a s s e s the 65 leading companies outside tha. In the US, re~essioncompo~nds these difficulties. prices since August 1990. The biggest gainers were Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Libya, Gabon, and Venners of the events following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. ezuela: they were best able to respond by increasing their own Robert Horton of British Petroleum commented that "every production. Saudi Aramco went from 5.3 million b/d in July dollar increase in the price of a barrel of crude adds $200 1990 to 8.35 million b/d five months later. Production capacmillion to my bottom line."l6 More important than the crude ity is to rise to 10 million b/d in three ~e a r s . 2~ price itself are the price differentials between crude oil and oil products and between wholesale and retail markets. Thus oil companies reported more spectacular profits in the 4th quar-Structural Aspects ter of 1990 and the 1st quarter of 1991, when crude prices declined gradually, than in the 3rd when they surged up-The nationalization of oil resources by OPEC governments in wards.17 the 1970s led to a sharp drop of the crude oil availability for This may have been a one-time bonanza. When the war the international oil companies. "Vertical integration7'-the started in January, oil prices on the futures market dropped by balance between upstream and downstream operations or, to $10,the largest-ever one-day decrease. When Iraq and Kuwait put it differently, a corporation's control over sufficient quanre-enter the market, the result may well be an oil glut, tities of crude oil production to supply its refining and marketdepressing prices.
ing outlets-came to an abrupt end. The companies subseThree major factors determine corporate profits. The first quently sought to replace lost reserves by exploring in a concerns the extent to which a company is able to supply its variety of non-OPEC countries and, during the mid-1980s, by refining facilities and marketing networks with its own crude acquiring other firms with proven reserves-"prospecting on production (see Table 3 ), and the degree to which it operates Wall Street."22 But most still purchase substantial amounts of in low-tax areas. Some 54 percent of BP's net income stems crude or refined oil, through contractual relationships or in from crude production, and its "self-sufficiency" rate is higher the open market, to balance their operations. During the 1980s, the global oversupply of oil allowed the companies to put pressure on producer governments to lower prices and gradually to abandon them in favor of prices set in spot and futures markets.23
In the last few years, growing numbers of oil-producing countries have felt compelled by shortages of capital, skills or technology to invite exploration ventures by private oil companies after excluding them for decades. Nations that have already welcomed back foreign firms include the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, Venezuela, and Algeria, and others in Eastern Europe. Together they represent one third of current world oil output. As the Petroleum Intelligence Weekly commented: "In the Middle East. . .a dramatic move away from resource nationalism is providing opportunities for oil companies to move back into that corner of the world."
The international oil companies may thus find a new avenue toward vertical reintegration. Before its Kuwait adventure, cash-strapped Iraq was the first state in the Gulf region to invite international oil firms to develop known oil fields.24 The Financial Times subsequently reported that "the crisis in the Gulf may force Kuwait to consider allowing foreign ownership of petroleum assets as a means of enhancing its future security. . . . "25
The national oil companies are facing the opposite situation: they control huge oil deposits but lack sufficient outlets. OPEC governments have tried to boost the share of their crude production that is sold in the form of products by constructing refineries and acquiring gasoline stations in Western Europe and North America. Kuwait Petroleum Corporation has been at the leading edge of this move downstream, followed by Venezuela's PDV and Saudi Aramco.26 Tables 3 and 4 portray the upstream/downstream disparities between state oil companies and private international companies. Both are trying to (re-)build vertically integrated structures, from opposite vantage points. It seems the world oil industry is entering a new era. In the absence of serious efforts to enhance energy efficiency and to develop renewable sources of energy, oil demand is set to grow; only the Gulf states seem able to satisfy that demand. With both sides heavily investing capital and technology-the private firms in exploration and production in the oil-rich countries, and the state companies in refining and marketing in the major markets-both have an overriding interest in stable prices and stable politics as well. Edward Morse of Petroleum Intelligence Weekly presented the case for condominium recently, arguing that "it is no longer a case of 'us versus them.' It is now much more an issue of how differing endowments of geology,capital, technology and human resources complement one another."27 Iraq, by invading Kuwait, was moving to augment its endowments of geology and capital, and in the process to redefine the political relationships that have linked the OPEC producers, the companies, and the governments of the industrial consuming countries. Saudi Arabia identifies itself closely with the economic and political interests of the US and the major European states. But in "representing" these interests in OPEC and Arab politics, the Saudis have had to take account of the balance of forces in the region. It was this balance that Iraq attempted to restructure, and the US was determined to reimpose.
The arrangements that will follow the US defeat of Iraq will likely produce a kind of joint "oil dominion" between major consumer countries and a core of oil exporters which will override the interests of the poorer oil importers and exporters alike. At the center of this new alignment will no longerhe the "seven sistersu-the major private companies that dominated the industry before the 1970s-but what South magazine has dubbed the "four stepsistersH-Saudi Aramco, PDV, and Exxon and Shell, the two largest private firms.28 But OPEC will have to confront some serious conflicts within its ranks which may well split the organization. Producers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Venezuela are investing huge amounts of capital to expand their production capacity: will they be ready to scale back their market share once Iraq and Kuwait resume production?29 The new world order of oil could bring unprecedented producer-consumer cooperation for the privileged states and companies, and increasingly harder times for the rest. territories for exploration and remove obstacles to nuclear power plant construction. Energy policy alternatives are explored by Christopher Flavin, "Conquering US Oil Depen-
